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BOOK REVIEW 
Steven F. Friedell** 
Anyone who has taught Jewish law in an American law 
school has probably encountered a well-meaning colleague or 
student who has asked something like the following: 'Why 
should I study Jewish law? Isn't it all just a lot of formalism 
and legalism? Other than as an  historical oddity, what interest 
can it have?" For a long time people have had the misconc- 
eption that Jewish law is overly formal, that it gives slavish 
obedience to the letter of the law, and that it is oblivious to 
practical consequences. This misconception can be fostered by 
reading excerpts from the Talmud that appear to discuss 
matters of intense personal pain and anguish in abstract legal 
terms.' The misconception of Jewish law is so ingrained in 
secular society that it is doubtful that the publication of any 
one book or article will remove it. But a start has to be made, 
and Professor Aaron Kirschenbaum's two recent books on 
Jewish law are a ready antidote for anyone who thinks Jewish 
law is only a set of formal rules.2 
With Professor Kirschenbaum's books as the foundation 
and starting point of my discussion on equity in  Jewish law, 
Part I of this review discusses how Jewish law used equity to 
govern particular cases. I suggest that the view of Jewish law 
* Aaron Kirschenbaum is a Professor of Law a t  Tel Aviv University School 
of Law. BA. 1946, Brooklyn College; D.H.L. 1967, Jewish Theological Seminary; 
Ph.D. 1969, Columbia University. 
** Professor of Law, Rutgers University (Camden). B.A., 1971, Brandeis 
University; J.D., 1974, The University of Michigan. 
1. See JUDITH PLASKOW, STANDING AGAIN AT SINAI: JUDAISM FROM A 
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 68-70 (1990). 
2. AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, EQUITY IN JEWISH LAW, HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES 
IN LAW: FORMALISM AND FLEXIBILITY IN JEWISH CML LAW, KTAV Publishing 
House, 1991, 324 pp. $35 [hereinafker KIRSCHENBAUM, HALAKHIc PERSPECTIVES]; 
AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, EQUITY IN JEWISH LAW, BEYOND EQUITY: HALAKHIC 
ASPIRATIONISM IN JEWISH CML LAW, KTAV Publishing House, 1991, 238 pp. $35 
[hereinafter KIRSCHENBAUM, BEYOND EQUITY]. 
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as formalistic is based in part on a confusion of the study of 
Jewish law as a religious discipline with the application of that 
law in actual cases. Part I1 discusses some implications that 
result from an  understanding that Jewish law as i t  was 
practiced was a religious legal system with its own set of 
values. By comparing the differing goals and values of Jewish 
law with those of American law, I will demonstrate that Jewish 
legal rules are not likely to be acceptable to modern societies. 
Similarly I will discuss why the current Israeli method of 
incorporating only "mishpat ivri" (the non-religious aspects of 
Jewish law such as torts and contracts) into the Israeli legal 
system is fundamentally flawed. The effort to incorporate only 
secular aspects of Jewish law into the law of Israel is not likely 
to present an accurate application of Jewish law because such 
incorporation will take these rules out of context. 
In  his books, Professor Kirschenbaum marshals an 
impressive array of talmudic3 and post-talmudic sources, 
codes, commentaries, responsa, and writings on philosophy, 
religion, and mysticism. If the only achievement of these two 
books were to present the reader with this array of fascinating 
texts it would be enough. But the books also present a variety 
of equitable methods used by the rabbis to do justice in 
individual cases. These methods included interpretation, 
compromise, a tailoring of justice to the individual case and to 
the individual litigants, and an aspiration to assume greater 
obligations than strict law would require. 
Beginning with a description of equity in Greek philosophy 
and Roman and English law, Professor Kirschenbaum 
demonstrates that although Jewish law has no exact equivalent 
to the concept of equity found in these other systems, there are 
several parallels. The Jewish concepts of "yosher" 
(uprightness), "darkhei no'am" (ways of pleasantness), ''lifnim 
mishurat hadin" (above and beyond the letter of the law), 
3. The Talmud is defined as "[tlhe collection of ancient Rabbinic writings 
consisting of the Mishnah and the Gemara, constituting the basis of religious 
authority for traditional Judaism." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1313 (2d 
ed. 1973). Actually, there are two Talmuds. One was compiled in Babylonia-the 
Babylonian Talmud, and one was compiled in Palestine-the 'Western" or 
"Jerusalem" Talmud. See generally ELLIOT N .  DORFT & ARTHUR ROSm, A LIVING 
TREE: THE ROOTS AND GROWTH OF JEWISH LAW 143-44 (1988); ADIN STEINSALIZ, 
THE ESSENTIAL TALMUD 40-63 (Chaya Galai trans., 1976). 
9091 BOOK REVIEW: EQUITY IN JEWISH LAW 
"middat hassidut" (saintliness), and other related concepts 
combine to create for the judges and the community a culture 
of responsibility and care that goes beyond the requirements of 
strict law. Kirschenbaum's books show the development of 
these and related equitable concepts in Jewish law and 
demonstrate their use in legal materials from talmudic times 
until the present. 
Professor Kirschenbaum answers the colleague or student 
who misunderstands the nature of Jewish law by making the 
distinction between the formalism of the study of Jewish law 
and its more equitable practice in actual cases. Kirschenbaum 
points out that the study of the Talmud can be highly abstract. 
The reality that it creates can be far removed from everyday 
life. Part of the joy of talmudic study (once one understands the 
Aramaic and Hebrew terms) is to find contradictions within the 
text and to resolve them, to probe a text for a variety of 
possible meanings, and to attempt to create a coherent 
structure that harmonizes as many points of view as possible. 
The activity can be highly abstract and formal. The Talmud 
requires one to deal with problems that no longer arise. For 
example, much of the Talmud deals with the ancient Temple, 
the animal sacrifices, and the priestly caste.4 A student of the 
Talmud cannot avoid these religious concepts by attempting to 
study only non-religious law, such as the talmudic law of torts 
or crimes, because the religious concepts creep in at various 
points. Thus, one encounters questions about the tort liabilities 
associated with an animal that has been donated to the 
T e m ~ l e , ~  procedure for trials involving the High P r i e ~ t , ~  and a 
host of other matters that might illumine the general area 
under study. Indeed, the Talmud devotes attention to the study 
of problems that it  assumes never or hardly ever arose. For 
instance, the tractate Sanhedrin devotes several pages to the 
rules applied to the rebellious son, who under biblical law is 
4. For instance, one of the six orders of the Mishnah is called Kodashim. It 
concerns primarily the types of sacrifices that the priests offered in the Temple. 
These subjects are also discussed in many other places in the Talmud. For 
example, the beginning tractate of the Mishnah, which deals primarily with 
blessings, defines the time for reciting part of the evening service by reference to 
' when priests who had been ritually unclean may begin to eat "terumah," food 
which possesses a degree of sanctity. Berakhot 1:l. 
5. E.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Baba Kamma 37b, 53b [hereinafter B. 
TALMUD]. 
6. E.g., B. TALMUD, Sanhedrin 18a; JERUSALEM TALMUD, Sanhedrin 2:l. 
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subject to the death penalty.7 The discussion is purely 
abstract. No specific cases are mentioned. Indeed, the rabbis 
construed the definition of a rebellious son so narrowly that 
some of the talmudic rabbis thought there never was and never 
would be an actual case? Why are these formalistic matters 
studied? The study of the Torah9-upon which the Talmud is 
based-is a religious activity, and like all religious activities, a t  
least part of the reward is inherent in the activity itself.'' In 
addition, the study of the Torah is a way of experiencing God's 
revelation. The Talmud states that a father who teaches his 
son the Talmud is regarded as if he had himself stood a t  
Sinai." Why? Because the revelation that began a t  Sinai 
continues and is made manifest whenever the Torah is studied. 
The study of the Torah is parallel to prayer, for both involve a 
communion with God. l2 
In  contrast to the formalism of the study of Jewish law, 
Professor Kirschenbaum demonstrates that the resolution of an  
actual dispute is an equitable activity. I t  is not an abstract 
exercise in  reasoning but a practical resolution of a problem. 
The goal is to reconcile the parties. According to talmudic law, 
lawyers ought to be excluded from the entire trial process.13 
This forces the parties to confront one another directly before a 
religious tribunal. The goal is not simply to unveil the truth a t  
all costs, but to resolve the dispute in a manner that heals the 
wounds between the parties and within the cornm~nity.'~ 
Jewish courts can proceed under the method of strict law or by 
the method of compromise if authorized by the parties. 
Compromise means that the court will impose a solution that 
differs from the requirements of strict law and will respond to 
7. B. TALMUD, Sanhedrin 68b-72a; see Deuteronomy 21:18-21. 
8. B. TALMUD, Sanhedrin 71a. 
9. "Torah" refers to the five books of Moses and also to the oral law which 
is reflected in part in the Mishnah, Talmud, and later sources. 
10. As the Talmud recites in c o ~ e d i o n  with the law of the rebellious son, 
'Why then was this law written?-That you may study it and receive reward." 
B. TALMUD, Sanhedrin 71a. 
11. See B. TALMUD, Berakoth 21b. 
12. The Talmud teaches that one ought to pray where one studies because 
after the destruction of the Temple, God is only found within four cubits of the 
Torah. B. TALMUD, Berakoth 8a. 
13. See KIRSCHENBAUM, HALAKHlc PERSPECTIVES, supm note 2, at 139-40. 
14. Maimonides, physician and codifier, drew the analogy between healing 
illness and resolving civil disputes. Id. at 284 (citing MAIMoNIDES, GUIDE OF THE 
PERPLEXED 34 (S. Pines ed. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1963)). 
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the "equities" and special features of the particular case.15 
Unlike the American system of trial, which considers the 
adversary system to be the best method for uncovering the 
truth, the Jewish system is more dubious about the ability of 
witnesses and fact finders to determine what actually 
happened. In addition, the Jewish system recognizes that the 
dispute over what happened may play only a small part in the 
complex relationship between the parties. 
Jewish courts strongly encourage parties to authorize the 
court to impose a compromise. But even when the parties do 
not give that authorization, Jewish law gives the judge some 
discretion. When the law or facts are unclear, the rabbi is to 
follow his intuition and judgment to seek peace? Even when 
the law and facts seem clear, the rabbi has considerable power 
to adjust the law to the subtleties of the facts before him." 
These and other examples of equity in Jewish law are used by 
Professor Kirschenbaum to dispel the misconception that 
Jewish law is only a set of formal rules. 
11. VALUES UNDERLYING JEWISH LAW AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
OF A RELIGIOUS LEGAL SYSTEM 
A. Comparing Jewish and American Law: Why Incorporating 
Jewish Law into the Law of a Modern State Is Difficult 
Professor Kirschenbaum's books discuss whether the val- 
ues underlying Jewish law differ from those underlying a mod- 
ern legal system. While there are many similarities in both 
systems, there are some h d a m e n t a l  differences in their out- 
look and goals as well. American law, for example, places a 
high value on individualism, free enterprise, and privacy. Jew- 
ish law, while not always opposed to these goals, has other 
aspirations that may cause conflict. Foremost among these 
goals is support for the study of the Torah and the mainte- 
nance of a religious community committed to mutual support 
through acts of loving kindness.18 
15. Id. at 137-49. 
16. RESPONSA ROSH 107:6. 
17. See, e.g., KIRSCHENBAUM, HALAKHIc PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 86-108 
(coping with improper behavior by litigants); KIRSCHENBAUM, BEYOND EQUITY, 
supm note 2, at 56-57 (some rules are not to be taught in public); id. at 201 
(whether a man is obligated to support children born of a civil intermarriage, 
which is invalid in !he eyes of Jewish law, depends on the facts and circumstances 
of the case). 
18. Simon the Just said, "Upon three things the world is based: upon the To- 
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The differences between the goals of the two systems sur- 
face in a variety of settings. Two areas mentioned by 
Kirschenbaum are monopolies and freedom of contract.lg 
American law generally views monopolies as an undesirable re- 
straint on trade, and generally favors the notion of freedom of 
contract, subject to the prevention of fraud or overreaching. By 
contrast, Jewish law generally favored the use of monopo- 
lies.20 It  also limited the ability of merchants to compete free- 
ly. Regulated monopolies were viewed both as a protection to 
the community and as an equitable means of ensuring a merch- 
ant's livelihood. For example, communities were authorized to 
fix prices for essential c~mmodi t ies .~~  In the field of contracts, 
Jewish law was willing to overturn a fairly negotiated contract 
if doing so would conform to the "ways of pleasantness" of the 
Torah. Thus, a renter could be compelled to give up his lease if 
the owner convinced the court that "his financial situation 
[was] such that he [was] compelled to sell his house and that 
the buyers [had] made the sale conditional on their immediate 
occupancy of the premises."22 
From an American legal perspective, monopolies, limita- 
tions on competition, and limitations on freedom of contract 
impede economic growth and limit individual freedom. But 
from a Jewish law perspective, these restrictions were neces- 
sary to prevent harm to other members in the community. 
They were a natural outgrowth of the religious teachings that 
members of the community must help one another. 
Another area where the differences between Jewish law 
and American law are striking is criminal law. No American 
court would try to dissuade an owner of stolen goods from ac- 
cepting the return of the goods from a repenting thief. The 
rah, upon Divine service, and upon acts of loving kindness." MISHNAH, Aboth 1:2 
(Herbert Danby trans., 1933). Some of the differences between Jewish law and 
American law are explored in Steven F. Friedell, The "Different Voice" in Jewish 
Law: Some Parallels to a Feminist Jurisprudence, 67 IND. L.J. 915 (1992). 
19. KIRSCHENBAUM, HALAKHIc PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at  178-80. 
20. See, e.g., SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 156:5. But no monopoly could 
be had over the teaching of the Torah. Id. at 156:3. 
21. Id. at 231:27. 
22. KIRSCHENBAUM, HALAKHIc PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 172. In the 
case referred to, Responsa Radbaz IV, 143, additional facts mitigate somewhat the 
seeming harshness of the rule. The lease was not for a fured period, rent was 
being paid monthly, and the owner was facing the prospect of going to a Gentile 
prison after trial in a Gentile court for debts owing to his Gentile creditors. Im- 
prisonment posed a risk of illness or death. The responsum m'akes no mention of 
any hardship to the renter. 
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thief's confession and sincere efforts to repent would at  most be 
taken into account in reducing the sentence. But the Talmud 
teaches that the owner should refuse the return of the stolen 
goods.23 Although later sources limited the reach of this tal- 
mudic rule, its existence suggests that Jewish law and Ameri- 
can law have different priorities. Jewish law is a religious sys- 
tem that places a high value on atonement. The rabbis were 
concerned that thieves might be prevented from repenting if 
restitution meant the loss of all of their possessions. 
Given these fundamental differences, it is no surprise that 
Jewish law and American law differ over the concept of unjust 
enrichment. As shown by Kirschenbaum, American law re- 
quires restitution from a defendant who has been unjustly 
enriched even if the enrichment caused no tangible loss to the 
plaintiff. By contrast, Jewish law requires no restitution in 
such cases.24 For instance, Jewish law denies restitution to  
the owner of a vacant building if a squatter occupies the build- 
ing without causing any tangible loss to the owner. In Ameri- 
can law, the owner's loss of exclusive right to possession is 
regarded as a loss that entitles the owner to  re~t i tu t ion.~~ The 
Jewish approach gives less respect to the individual's right to 
ownership and gives more weight to the obligation to  help 
others in distress. Unjust enrichment is an open-ended concept. 
Not only is the concept of "enrichment" subject to debate, but 
the concept of "unjustness" calls on all the policies of the under- 
lying legal system.26 Kirschenbaum explores both the Ameri- 
can and the Jewish law of unjust enrichment, highlighting 
these basic differences in outlook. 
Because American and Jewish law have different values, 
caution must be used in comparing doctrines in the two legal 
systems that appear similar on the surface. A good example is 
a two-hundred-year-old case in Jewish law that invites paral- 
lels to modern economic theories. As discussed by 
Kirschenbaum, there was a dispute between brothers who 
owned different floors of a house. One brother wanted to open a 
bar on an upper story which he owned. The other brother pro- 
tested that the bar would create disturbing noise below. A 
23. KIRSCHENBAUM, BEYOND EQUITY, supm note 2, at 81-83. 
24. URSCHENBAUM, HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 231-52. 
25. See 1 GEORGE .  PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 5 2.10 (1978). 
26. See Jay M. Feinman, The Law of Restitution, 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 689, 696 
(1980) (reviewing GEORGE . PALMER, THE LAW OF R E ~ T I O N  (1978)). 
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mishnah apparently gave the protesting brother a solid case; it 
allows neighbors to  protest the opening of a shop but not the 
opening of a factory within a ~ourtyard.~' But one of the lead- 
ing authorities of the day, Rabbi Moses Sofer-Schreiber, inter- 
preted this passage to mean that the court must consider the 
cost of alternatives. Since a shop can normally be opened on 
the street at little cost, the neighbors of the courtyard may 
protest. But since a factory can normally be moved only at 
great cost, residents may not protest. In the case at hand, Rab- 
bi Sofer found that the cost of renting new space for the bar or 
of trying to sell liquor on the street would be prohibitively 
expensive. If the owner from the upper story could be enjoined 
from opening a bar, then "nobody would ever be able to make a 
living.'a8 
Kirschenbaum correctly reads Rabbi Sofer's responsum as 
showing that Jewish law refuses to  resolve disputes by applica- 
tion of formal rules.29 But one could read the case as foreshad- 
owing the modern economic approach that all nuisance dis- 
putes ought to  be resolved in the most cost-efficient way. 
Kirschenbaum avoids the temptation to do so, and I think such 
a reading would be inconsistent with other Jewish values. At 
stake for the owner of the upper story was the opportunity "to 
make a living," not the opportunity of making a fortune. A 
property owner can be forced to tolerate noise if the alternative 
is to  put someone out of business. But all nuisance cases are 
not necessarily to be decided in favor of the most cost-efficient 
user. Judaism did not despise wealth; rather, the role of mak- 
ing money was subordinate to the study of the Torah. The real 
value of making a living was that it enabled one to study the 
Torah or, at least, to support others in their study of it?' 
B. "Mishpat Ivri" Cannot Be Faithfully Incorporated 
into the Israeli Legal System 
A number of consequences follow from recognizing that 
Jewish law differs not only in some incidental matters from a 
27. MISHNAH, Bava Batm 2:3. 
28. Responsa Hatam Sofer, HM. 92. 
29. KIRSCHENBAUM, HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 108-10. 
30. See B. TALMUD, Berakoth 34b; cf Yehoshua Liebermam, The Coase Theo- 
rem in Jewish Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 293, 297 (1981) (the owner of a courtyard 
may not protest that there is too much noise from the voices of school children 
studying the Torah since the value of Jewish education is very high). 
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secular legal system, but also in its fundamental outlook, struc- 
ture and purpose. One consequence is to recognize the limita- 
tions of the modern Israeli approach to the study of Jewish law 
known as "mishpat ivri." This modern Hebrew term was coined 
to connote those subjects of Jewish law that are relevant to the 
operation of a secular so~iety.~'  There is nothing wrong with 
focusing on these matters, nor is i t  wrong to try to incorporate 
Jewish law into the legal framework of the State of Israel. But 
because the concept of "mishpat ivri" is foreign to Jewish law, 
the modern approach is unlikely to present an accurate picture 
of the subjects studied. 
First of all, in order to understand many of the terms and 
concepts that are implicated in a study of torts, contracts, or 
criminal law, one has to see how those terms and concepts are 
used within religious settings. A modern student of Jewish law 
cannot avoid studying questions like the liability of animals 
that have been devoted to the sanctuary or the immunity of the 
High Priest. More importantly, one cannot paint an accurate 
picture of Jewish law by focusing on the abstract treatment of 
portions of the substantive law; one must see how that law was 
put into practice. Furthermore, the practice of Jewish law was 
intimately tied to the religious courts, the religious belief struc- 
tures and practices of the communities, and the religious aspi- 
rations of the Jewish people. 
For example, the prohibition of usury was seen in Jewish 
law as a religious problem, not merely a limitation on contract. 
As Kirschenbaum demonstrates, Jewish law viewed usury not 
as a violation of natural law but as a violation of the require- 
ment of "hesed" or loving kindness that members of the com- 
munity are expected to show one another.32 A modern court 
cannot hope to apply the Jewish rules governing usury without 
understanding the underlying religious purposes. 
Another instance is the Jewish law concept of "dinei 
shamayyim," or laws of heaven. Jewish tort law limited liabili- 
ty rather severely.33 One of the escapes from this limited lia- 
bility was that even though a defendant in some cases would 
be exempt under ('dihei adam" or human law, he might be 
liable under the laws of heaven. As Kirschenbaum shows, the 
31. See "Mishpat Ivri," 12 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 109 (1972). 
32. KIRSCHENBAUM, BEYOND EQUITY, supra note 2, at 25-44. 
33. See Steven F. Friedell, Some Observations on the Talmudic Law of Torts, 
15 RUTGERS L.J. 897, 902-08 (1984). 
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concept of liability under heavenly law could have tangible 
effects on earth. A rabbinic court might be able to coax a defen- 
dant into fulfilling his religious obligations and in  some cases 
might be able to coerce him to do so. Thus, a recalcitrant party 
might be barred from qualifying as a witness:4 and a plaintiff 
in such cases might be able to resort to self-help.35 
How can these concepts be successfully incorporated into a 
modern judicial scheme? If a secular court borrows only the 
limited liability that is available under human law, it achieves 
only superficial success. If it allows the plaintiff to pursue self- 
help, it goes beyond the field of tort law and may well encour- 
age breaches of the peace. If the court disqualifies the defen- 
dant from testifying in  other cases, it may undermine the pub- 
lic policies underlying the law of evidence and may unduly 
hamper the administration of justice. Successful incorporation 
would require an  integration of differing values and purposes, 
not merely the rules derived from them. 
The field of conflict of laws has given us the concept of 
dkpe~age, which is the resolution by a court of different issues 
in a case by resort to different legal systems.36 It  is doubtful 
that simple d6pe~age would sufficiently mesh Jewish law with 
modern legal systems. When a court resorts to d6pegage it runs 
the risk of creating a hybrid result that would not be achieved 
by either legal system. More than that, the result might be 
antithetical to both legal systems. For example, Jewish law 
imposes strict liability on individuals for harms directly caused 
by their bodies.37 It limits the effect of this liability by having 
no rule of respondeat ~upe r io r?~  by having no rule of joint and 
several liability,3g and by measuring damages in ways that 
generally benefit the defendanto4O If a secular court were to 
34. KIRSCHENBAUM, BEYOND EQUITY, supnz note 2, at 158-59. 
35. Id. at 151-57. 
36. See EUGENE I?. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 35 (2d ed. 
1992). 
37. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 421:3 (liability for damage even in case 
of force majeure). 
38. See Haim S. Hefetz, Vicarious Liability in Jewish Law, 6 DIN& ISRAEL 49 
(1975) (in Hebrew). 
39. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 410:37. 
40. According to Jewish law there are five possible types of damages that can 
be owed in a case of personal injuries committed by a person: damage, pain, loss 
of time, medical care and humiliation. Damage is only owed in case of force ma- 
jeure. Id. at 421:3. Damage was measured by comparing the loss of value based on 
the assumption that the plaintiff was a slave being sold in the market place. Id. 
at 420:15. Humiliation is due only in case of intent to cause humiliation. Id. at 
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incorporate the Jewish law of strict liability for certain torts 
and combine it with the secular doctrines of joint and several 
liability, respondeat superior, and liberal damage evaluation, 
the court would create a result that could not be reached by 
either legal system independently. Further, the result would 
also be antithetical to both legal systems. That is, the Jewish 
approach of strict liability limited to the individual defendant 
achieves a goal of localizing the blame on the individual whose 
activity caused the harm. I t  lightens the burden by measuring 
damages in a way that is generally favorable to the defendant. 
But if, in the name of Jewish law, the court were to punish a n  
employer for an injury that his employee only partially created, 
i t  might be perverting the values of Jewish law. Similarly, a 
secular approach that requires a showing of negligence does so, 
in part, to encourage activity that  may cause losses but is oth- 
erwise beneficial to the economy. However, the application of 
strict liability in such a circumstance may be antithetical to 
these goals. Thus, applying secular aspects of Jewish law in a 
modern legal system would distort the values of both Jewish 
law and the modern legal system. 
Professor Kirschenbaum's contribution to the study of 
Jewish law has been immense, and we are fortunate that these 
two books are written in English by a scholar familiar with the 
classical and modern analogies. His books persuasively ques- 
tion the notion that Jewish law is all formalism. No fair reader 
can ever conclude that Jewish law is oblivious to the conse- 
quences of a decision or to the underlying purposes and poli- 
cies. On the contrary, the books heighten our awareness that  
Jewish law has policies and purposes that are unique and that  
make the application of Jewish law in a modern legal system 
difficult. 
421:l. Pain was the amount that a plaintiff would pay to avoid having to undergo 
the pain. Id. at 420:16. 
